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ABSTRACT
This paper compares the compliance level of Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) listed construction and non-construction 
companies with the ASX Corporate Governance Council (CGC)
recommendations on sound corporate governance. It also 
examines the difference in board characteristics between the 
two groups, paying particular attention to differences in board 
independence. It concludes that compared with the top 20 ASX 
listed non-construction companies, listed construction companies 
are less compliant overall particularly with regards to board 
structure, and have lower levels of independence both in terms of 
CEO/Chairperson duality, the ratio of executive to non-executive 
independent directors and independent membership of nomination, 
remuneration and audit committees. These conclusions are 
important because sound corporate governance has been 
associated with higher levels of organisational resilience derived 
from the reputational and fi nancial benefi ts of greater transparency, 
market value, investor attractiveness and organisational 
performance.
Keywords:  corporate governance, compliance, resilience, 
independence, Australian Stock Exchange.
INTRODUCTION
Du Plessis et al. (2005; p.6) defi ned corporate governance as 
“the process of controlling management and of balancing the 
interests of all internal stakeholders and other parties (external 
stakeholders, governments and local communities) who can 
be affected by the corporation’s conduct in order to ensure 
responsible behaviour by corporations and to achieve the 
maximum level of effi ciency and profi tability for a corporation”. 
There are three contemporary trends that have promoted concerns 
with corporate governance standards, namely: the recent wave 
of high profi le corporate scandals, globalisation, and increased 
investor activism. 
For example, in Australia, corporate collapses such as HIH 
and One.Tel have demonstrated the domestic ramifi cations of 
ineffective governance practices (among other things), while 
scandals like Enron and WorldCom in America have highlighted 
the global impact (Ingley and van der Walt, 2003; Donker and 
Zahir, 2008). According to ACCA (2008) these failures of corporate 
governance have been the principal cause of the current credit 
crisis. They have also resulted in unprecedented erosion of 
investor confi dence in trust managers, corporate managers and 
regulatory authorities which permitted these problems to arise 
undisclosed (Robins, 2006; Martin, 2001; Donker and Zahir, 2008). 
Globalisation has focused attention on governance because of 
associated increased competition for investment capital (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2003). With the increasing risks associated with 
providing credit, institutional investors are comparing organisations 
as potential investment opportunities and corporate governance 
structures are being used as an important point of comparison 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
Increased shareholder activism regarding standards of corporate 
governance has grown as the proportion of institutional investors 
to individual investors has grown. For example, Brancato and 
Rabimov (2008) found that institutional investors now own 76.4% 
of US companies and Mallin (2006) found that the rate is 50% 
in Australia. New legal requirements for institutional investors to 
act as ‘fi duciaries’ rather than short-term speculators is replacing 
short-term market myopia with a culture of ownership and greater 
concern for governance practices which ensure long-term stability 
(Monks and Minow, 2004; Davis et al., 2006).
The Building and Construction industry, like every industry, 
is exposed to investment capital competition, globalisation, 
investor activism and risk. This means that sound corporate 
governance is of central importance to its economic, social and 
environmental performance. More broadly, sound governance 
in the construction industry is important to society because 
construction is a key developmental industry with widespread 
social economic and environmental responsibilities (van Wyk 
and Chege, 2004). The industry is charged with creating and 
maintaining the built environment, which consists of homes, 
workplaces, schools, hospitals and other public amenities as well 
as essential infrastructure such as roads, water and electricity 
and telecommunications essential for our day to day living (ABS, 
2007). Furthermore, the industry’s products account for 23% of 
total greenhouse gas emissions, it directly employs about 875,000 
people, represents about 6% of GDP and invests about $158bn 
each year on new construction. In particular, the increasing 
trend for procurement of public services via public-private 
partnerships that place the delivery and management of critical 
public infrastructure and services in private company hands, has 
brought issues of sound corporate governance to the fore (PPP 
Forum, 2008). PPP projects such as the Sydney airport rail link, 
Sydney Harbour Tunnel and the recent $900m redevelopment of 
the Royal Children’s Hospital in Melbourne demonstrate the public 
signifi cance of the projects being undertaken and the potential 
implications of poor governance (Chang et al., 2006).
Given the above, it is surprising that the issue of corporate 
governance in the construction industry has received little 
attention. One notable exception is the work of Chang et al. (2006) 
who investigated the relative compliance of UK listed construction 
companies with the disclosure requirements of the UK Combined 
Code compared with the top 50 companies listed in the UK. Their 
research determined that UK listed construction companies: (1) 
demonstrated lower levels of disclosure of corporate governance 
information than the top 50 group, (2) had lower levels of 
board independence based on the separation of the CEO and 
chairperson position and independence of directors, and (3) made 
less use of external consulting services for advice. They noted that 
the disparity between the construction group and the top 50 group 
was a concern which could potentially lead to adverse effects on 
the construction companies’ performance. 
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In the above context, the aim of this paper is to explore the 
compliance levels of Australian listed construction companies with 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s guidelines (ASX, 2003) 
compared to the top 20 ASX listed non-construction companies. 
It will also examine the difference in board characteristics 
between the two groups, paying attention to the differences in 
board independence and discuss the potential implications in any 
differences that are discovered in both compliance and board 
characteristics. 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Fundamental to the corporate governance structure of any 
organisation is the board of directors. This is the body, elected 
or appointed by the shareholders, to act on their behalf in 
directing and controlling the affairs of the organisation (Matheson, 
2004). The board of directors must satisfy a range statutory, 
common law and fi duciary responsibilities to the shareholders, 
other stakeholders and the organisation itself (Lawler III et al., 
2002). This includes ensuring compliance with all relevant legal 
and regulatory requirements and promoting organisational 
performance. The latter is achieved through advising the CEO 
in the formulation of strategy and direction, evaluating CEO and 
senior manager performance, the acquisition and allocation of key 
resources, setting policies that guide and constrain management 
action and organisational culture, ensuring systems are in place to 
manage risk effectively, and ensuring the continuous improvement 
of the organisation’s performance through constant monitoring and 
supervising of executive management (Scherrer, 2003; Nadler, 
2004).
Directors are elected to boards for their industry or general 
business experience and expertise that they are expected to bring 
to the organisation in the form of advice and guidance for the CEO 
and the other members of the executive management team (Colley 
et al., 2003). Despite considerable research into the performance 
implications of board composition, it seems the only conclusion 
to draw is that there is no ‘best practice’ when it comes to board 
composition (Ingley and van der Walt, 2003; Matheson, 2004). It is 
widely accepted that board size is a refl ection of three key factors 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003): the size of the organisation (board size 
increases as organisation size increases); the type of organisation 
(listed organisations tend to have larger boards); and the 
organisational structure (as more diversifi ed organisations require 
representation from a wider array of business units and regions).
The size of the board should be large enough to provide required 
skills and experience, yet small enough to ensure effi cient 
interaction and director participation (Murphy and McIntyre, 2007).
Another issue of debate is the level of independence among 
directors that relates primarily to the ratio of inside (executive), 
versus outside (non-executive and independent non-executive) 
directors and the separation of the CEO and chairman roles 
(Murphy and McIntyre, 2007). Non-executive directors play two 
important roles for the board (Mallin, 2007): to control and balance 
the executive directors power, making sure that no one individual 
has too much infl uence over board decisions, and to provide 
important external contribution to the general leadership and 
development of the organisation. Recent changes in corporate 
governance regulations around the world, promoting greater 
independence, represent contemporary thought that majority 
independent boards result in higher corporate performance than 
executive-dominated boards (Van den Berghe and Baelden, 
2005). However, the evidence is confl icting as it is in the case of 
whether the two roles of CEO and chairman should be separated 
(Khanchel, 2007).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS
In response to the corporate scandals of the 1990s, many 
countries produced guides to best practice in corporate 
governance. In the UK, the Combined Code (2003) emerged out 
of the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports and in the US, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and revised NYSE listing requirements 
promoted stricter standards of corporate governance (NYSE, 
2008; du Plessis et al., 2005). In Australia, the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council produced the Principles of Good Governance 
and Best Practice Recommendations (2003), implemented 
amendments to the Corporations Act (2001), and introduced the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Act – CLERP 9 (2004) – which is essentially 
the Australian version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, strengthening 
the requirements of fi nancial auditing (Robins, 2006). The ASX 
recommendations lay down ten core principles of good corporate 
governance (see Table 1) that are required to be demonstrated 
in annual reports. If not demonstrated companies are required to 
explain why. 
METHOD
To compare the compliance level of ASX listed construction and 
non-construction companies with the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council Principles of Good Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (2003), a documentary analysis of qualitative 
and quantitative data in annual reports published by a sample of 
the top 20 ASX listed construction and non-construction companies 
was undertaken (see Table 2), based on market capitalisation, 
following the Chang et al. (2006) method. Construction companies 
were classifi ed as those with ‘construction’ mentioned in the 
‘principal activities’ section of their annual report. As part of its 
listing rules, the ASX requires that all listed organisations submit a 
Corporate Governance section in their annual reports that details 
their compliance with the ASX Principles and Recommendations 
along with an ‘if not, why not’ explanation for non-compliance with 
any of the recommendations. This section of the annual report was 
the basis of the documentary analysis supplemented by data from 
other parts of the report where necessary. For example, all annual 
reports included a section on the board of directors, detailing the 
number of directors, their independence and the presence of 
committees.
RESULTS
The companies’ compliance with the recommendations was 
recorded, as in Chang et al. (2006), using a system of “0” 
representing non-compliance and “1” meaning compliance. An 
average was then taken across the entire sample to get an overall 
mean score. Table 3 is a summary of the results which shows that 
the overall mean level of compliance for construction companies 
is lower (28.25) than for non-construction companies (29.75). The 
areas of difference are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows that in 
general construction fi rms are comparable in corporate governance 
compliance to the top 20 ASX regarding Principles 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 
10. In contrast, construction fi rms are less complaint regarding 
Principles 2, 4, 7 and 9.
Table 4 shows the summary of the board characteristics by 
comparing the average results of the two sample groups using 
the 0,1 scoring system explained above. Once again the level of 
overall compliance is lower in the construction sample.
The size of the board of the top 20 ASX listed non-construction 
companies ranged from 7 to 15 with an average number of 
10.30 directors. This is compared to an average of 7.30 directors 
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Principle Explanation 
1.  Lay solid 
foundations for 
management 
and oversight  
1.1  Formalise and disclose the functions reserved to the board and those delegated to 
management  
2.  Structure the 
board to add 
value 
2.1  A majority of the board should be independent directors  
2.2  The chairperson should be an independent director 
2.3  The roles of chairperson and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the same 
individual 
2.4  The board should establish a nomination which should have a minimum of 3 (majority 
independent) directors, chaired by the board chairperson or an independent director 
2.5  Provide details of the directors and their other appointments and reasons for non-
compliance with any of the recommendations 
3.  Promote ethical 
and responsible 
decision 
making  
3.1  Establish a code of conduct to guide the directors, the chief executive officer (or 
equivalent), the chief financial officer (or equivalent) and any other key executives as to: 
3.1.1  the practices necessary to maintain confidence in the company’s integrity 
3.1.2  the responsibility and accountability of individuals for reporting and investigating reports of 
unethical practices. 
3.2  Disclose the policy concerning trading in company securities by directors, officers and 
employees 
3.3  Provide information relating to the company's ethical requirements 
4.  Safeguard 
integrity in 
financial 
reporting  
4.1  Require the chief executive officer (or equivalent) and the chief financial officer (or 
equivalent) to state in writing to the board that the company’s financial reports present a 
true and fair view, in all material respects, of the company’s financial condition and 
operational results and are in accordance with relevant accounting standards 
4.2  The board should establish an audit committee 
4.3  Structure the audit committee so that it consists of: only non-executive directors, a majority 
of independent directors, and an independent chairperson, who is not chairperson of the 
board, at least three members. (Best practice would be only independent directors who 
are all financially literate, with at least one director with financial experience and one with 
industry knowledge) 
4.4  The audit committee should have a formal charter 
4.5  Provide information about the company's financial control systems to shareholders and 
the public 
5.  Make timely 
and balanced 
disclosure 
5.1  Establish written policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with ASX Listing 
Rule disclosure requirements and to ensure accountability at a senior management level 
for that compliance 
5.2  Provide information required by disclosure rules 
6.  Respect the 
rights of 
shareholders 
6.1  Design and disclose a communications strategy to promote effective communication with 
shareholders and encourage effective participation at general meetings  
6.2  Request the external auditor to attend the annual general meeting and be available to 
answer shareholder questions about the conduct of the audit and the preparation and 
content of the auditor’s report 
7.  Recognise and 
manage risk 
7.1  The board or appropriate board committee should establish policies on risk oversight and 
management. 
7.2  The chief executive officer (or equivalent) and the chief financial officer (or equivalent) 
should state to the board in writing that: 
7.2.1  the statement given in accordance with best practice recommendation 4.1 (the integrity of 
financial statements) is founded on a sound system of risk control which implements the 
policies adopted by the board.  
7.2.2  the company’s risk management and internal compliance and control system is operating 
efficiently and effectively in all material respects  
7.3  Provide information about risk management policies and systems 
8.  Encourage 
enhanced 
performance 
8.1  Disclose the process for performance evaluation of the board, its committees and 
individual directors, and key executives  
9.  Remunerate 
fairly and 
responsibly 
9.1  Provide disclosure in relation to the company’s remuneration policies  
9.2  The board should establish a remuneration Committee consisting of a minimum of 3 
(majority independent) directors and be chaired by an independent director. 
9.3  Clearly distinguish the structure of non-executive directors’ remuneration from that of 
executives; non-executives should not be offered retirement packages or performance 
bonuses. 
9.4  Ensure that payment of equity-based executive remuneration is made in accordance with 
thresholds set in plans approved by shareholders  
9.5  Provide information about the remuneration of executive and non-executive directors 
10.  Recognise the 
legitimate 
interests of 
shareholders  
10.1  Establish and disclose a code of conduct to guide compliance with legal and other 
obligations to legitimate stakeholders such as clients/customers and the community in 
which it operates 
Table 1: ASX 10 core principles of good corporate governance
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Table 2: Sample structure: ASX listed non-construction and construction companies
Table 3: Compliance with the ASX CGC recommendations
 
Top 20 Listed ASX  Listed Construction 
Company Employees 
Turnover 
($m)  Company Employees 
Turnover 
($m) 
AMP Bank (AMP) 4,000 11,018.00  AJ Lucas 500 216.40 
ANZ Bank (ANZ) 34,353 11,385.00  AV Jennings 450 632.20 
BHP Billiton (BHP) 39,000 47,473.00  Becton 247 259.60 
Brambles (BXB) 12,305 3,868.80  
Bovis Lend 
Lease 12,039 14,282.00 
Commonwealth 
Bank (CBA) 37,873 33,169.00  CEC Group 500 143.40 
CSL Limited (CSL) 8,423 3,310.00  Clough 4,000 761.20 
Fosters Group 
(FGL) 6,588 4,555.20  Devine 229 547.97 
Macquarie Bank 
(MQG) 13,000 14,833.00  Diploma 34 52.97 
National Aus. Bank 
(NAB) 43,000 44,448.00  Folkestone N/A 81.04 
QBE Insurance 
(QBE) 10,600 14,966.00  Forge 200 74.00 
Rio Tinto (RIO) 32,000 33,518.00  Leighton 30,000 11,891.50 
St George Bank 
(SGB) 8,074 3,272.00  Macmahon 3,000 966.00 
Stockland (SGP) 1,241 3,300.00  Mirvac N/A 2,220.90 
Suncorp (SUN) 16,319 7,545.00  Stockland 1,241 3,300.00 
Telstra (TLS) 35,706 23,960.00  Sunland N/A 634.27 
Westpac Bank 
(WBC) 28,000 25,935.00  
Thomas & 
Coffey 1,000 219.00 
Westfield (WDC) 4,974 6,663.50  United 29,000 3,500.00 
Wesfarmers (WES) 30,000 9,754.00  VDM Group 900 232.11 
Woolworths 
(WOW) 180,000 42,586.80  Watpac 319 644.85 
Woodside 
Petroleum (WPL) 2,981 4,000.00  Westfield 4,974 6,663.50 
 
  ASX Top 20 Construction 
1.1 1.00 1.00 
2.1 1.00 0.55 
2.2 0.85 0.80 
2.3  0.95 0.85 
2.4 1.00 0.70 
2.5 1.00 1.00 
3.1     
       3.1.1 1.00 1.00 
       3.1.2 1.00 1.00 
3.2 1.00 1.00 
3.3 1.00 1.00 
4.1 1.00 1.00 
4.2 1.00 1.00 
4.3 1.00 0.75 
4.4 1.00 1.00 
4.5 1.00 1.00 
5.1 1.00 1.00 
5.2 1.00 1.00 
6.1 1.00 1.00 
6.2 1.00 0.95 
7.1 1.00 0.95 
7.2     
       7.2.1 1.00 0.95 
       7.2.2 1.00 0.95 
7.3  1.00 1.00 
8.1 1.00 1.00 
9.1 1.00 1.00 
9.2 1.00 0.90 
9.3 1.00 1.00 
9.4 0.95 0.90 
9.5 1.00 1.00 
10.1 1.00 1.00 
 
Aggregate Score 
 
29.75 
 
28.25 
 
The Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building [Vol 9, No 2] 11
Figure 1: Summary of ASX compliance comparison
Table 4: Comparisons of average results for characteristics of the board of directors
and board committees between ASX Top 20 and construction
 
  ASX Top 20  Construction 
Board Composition     
Are Chairman and CEO separated? 0.95 0.85 
("0" for "No"; "1" for "Yes")     
No. of Directors 10.30 7.30 
No. Exec Directors (inc. chairman) 1.80 2.10 
No. Non-Executive Directors 8.50 5.15 
No. Non-Executives considered 
Independent 8.15 4.40 
Nomination Committee     
No. Directors 5.15 4.15 
No. Non-Executive Directors 4.95 3.15 
     
Remuneration Committee     
No. Directors 3.75 3.80 
No. Non-Executive Directors 3.75 3.05 
     
Audit Committee     
No. Directors 4.50 3.25 
No. Non-Executive Directors 4.50 3.00 
 
Aggregate score 56.30 40.20 
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on construction boards, ranging from 3 directors up to 13. A 
comparison between the two groups’ board sizes is illustrated in 
Figure 2.
In terms of independence, the ratio of executive to non executive 
directors was on average 82.5% for the top 20 ASX listed 
companies and 70.5% for construction. The top 20 ASX listed 
companies’ non-executive directors were almost all considered 
independent, with 96% meeting the ASX CGC independence 
guidelines whereas 85.4% met this standard in the construction 
group. These results give an overall independence level 
(independent directors to non-independent directors, according to 
the ASX CGC guidelines) of 79% for the top 20 non-construction 
group and 60% for the construction group. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3.
The important factor when looking at the various board committees 
required by the ASX guidelines is the levels of independence. The 
Figure 3: Independence levels
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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Constructio ASX Top 
Executive Non-Executive Non-Executives 
Figure 2: Comparison of board sizes
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average size of the nomination committees in the top 20 ASX listed 
companies was 5.15 members, of which 96% were independent 
compared to construction that were smaller and less independent 
with an average of 4.15 members, of which 76% were independent 
directors. Seven construction companies had their whole boards 
acting as the nomination committee, which contrasts with the ASX 
guidance which recommends a separate nomination committee 
within a minimum of 3 (majority independent) directors, chaired by 
the board chairperson or an independent director. 
The top 20 ASX listed companies recorded a 100% independence 
score for their remuneration committees, whose average size was 
3.75 directors. The listed construction companies had a slightly 
higher average membership of 3.80 with 80% of these members 
being independent. This complies with the ASX recommendation 
that the board should establish a remuneration committee and 
that this should consist of a minimum of 3 (majority independent) 
directors and be chaired by an independent director.
The top 20 ASX listed companies recorded a 100% independence 
score for their audit committees, whose average size was 4.50. 
The construction companies again differed with an average of 3.25 
members, 92% of them being independent. This does, however, 
comply with the ASX guidelines that require the audit committee to 
be structured so that it consists of: only non-executive directors, a 
majority of independent directors, and an independent chairperson 
who is not chairperson of the board, and at least three members. 
Best practice would be only independent directors who are 
all fi nancially literate, with at least one director with fi nancial 
experience and one with industry knowledge.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this paper was to investigate the apparent relative 
compliance in annual reports of construction and non construction 
organisations listed on the ASX with the ASX CGC ‘Principles of 
Good Governance and Best Practice Recommendations’. These 
were introduced in 2003, presenting a list of 30 recommendations 
for companies to achieve best practice in corporate governance. 
Compliance with these recommendations is a clear indication of an 
organisation’s commitment to achieving best practice in corporate 
governance. In summary, it was found that, compared with the 
top 20 ASX listed companies, the Australian listed construction 
companies: (1) were less compliant with the ASX CGC principles 
and recommendations, particularly with regards to Principle 2, 
Structure of the Board; (2) had smaller boards with lower levels of 
independence both in terms of CEO-Chairperson duality and ratio 
of executive to non-executive independent directors; and (3) had 
less independent nomination, remuneration and audit committee 
membership. 
Before discussing the implications of these results, it is worth 
reiterating that there is general acceptance that there is no single 
best board structure. Enforcing compliance requirements for board 
structure effectively removes the ability of an organisation to create 
a competitive advantage through developing what it considers 
to be its most effective board for its operating environment and 
business and it is not proposed to do that here. For example, 
organisational size and turnover is one of the key infl uences on 
size and structure of the board and committee composition and 
will therefore have infl uenced the differences discovered in this 
research between the two samples. This is because smaller 
companies do not face the same operational issues as larger 
ones and are less able to afford the costs of compliance than 
larger companies. This is relevant because the top 20 ASX listed 
non-construction companies in our sample were signifi cantly larger 
(approximately six times) than the listed construction companies 
group in both employment numbers and turnover (see Table 5). 
While it could be argued that this makes comparison problematic, 
they are all subject to the same ASX guidelines, and comparison is 
valid with these limitations in mind.
In order to determine if there was a link between the size of the 
organisation and the size of the board in the two sample groups, 
the Spearman Rank Correlation test was performed using both 
measurements for organisational size in Table 2 (number of 
employees and turnover). The results indicated strong correlations 
in both cases (0.6664 for employees and 0.70863 for turnover).
Notwithstanding these qualifi cations, our results show that the 
Australian listed construction companies are less compliant 
with the ASX CGC principles and recommendations than the 
benchmark group of the top 20 ASX listed companies. This 
supports the fi ndings of Chang et al. (2006) in the UK. The 
implications of these fi ndings are important given that higher 
compliance is generally desirable, given these guidelines are 
designed to instil confi dence in the international investment 
community about the monitoring of risk management and strategy: 
a critical issue in the recent credit constrained environment with 
uncertainties revolving around extreme market volatility. There 
is also evidence that lower compliance may also lead to poor 
organisational performance. For example, a recent study for the 
Association of British Insurers by Selvaggi and Upton (2008) 
found that companies with high compliance with the corporate 
Table 5: Summary of sizes of the two sample groups
 
Group Employment Turnover   
Top 20 ASX n = 20 n = 20   
  Mean = 27,422 Mean = $17.48 Billion 
  Sd = 37,589 Sd = $14.8 Billion 
  Max = 180,000 Max = $47.47 Billion 
  Min = 1,241 Min = $3.27 Billion 
      
Construction n = 17* n = 20   
  Mean = 5,214 Mean = $2.37 Billion 
  Sd = 8,795 Sd = $3.93 Billion 
  Max = 30,000 Max = $14.28 Billion 
  Min = 34 Min = $0.053 Billion 
 *Three of the construction companies did not disclose their number of employees 
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governance codes exhibited higher returns (up to 18% higher) 
than those with lower compliance. The study also found that 
lower compliance led to lower intra-industry performance, higher 
volatility of share returns and lower chances of investment capital. 
There is also evidence that investors are willing to pay a premium 
for companies that demonstrate strong corporate governance 
credentials and that such companies tend to attract investors 
with a longer-term return horizon, thus promoting greater stability 
in stock prices, market value and greater resilience to the 
turbulence of market speculation (Coombes and Watson, 2000).
The implications of the smaller board size found in construction 
organisations are both positive and negative. While larger boards 
bring a wider variety of experience and knowledge, have greater 
resource availability and are less likely of being dominated 
by a CEO, their size if not managed well and can result in 
communication and coordination problems not encountered with 
smaller boards. In contrast, smaller boards can be dominated 
by a CEO, have less varied experience for identifying risks and 
trends, but can be more responsive and effi cient in their decision-
making.
The differences in the independence of the board are perhaps the 
most important fi nding. When independence is high, the board 
has a more objective and independent judgment and is more 
vigilant in monitoring, independent directors are less afraid to 
question the CEO, and are more likely to fi re an underperforming 
CEO (Bollard, 2003). When it is low, there is the risk of CEO 
domination, independent directors not having enough infl uence, 
and less vigilant monitoring of company performance. The higher 
incidence of CEO-Chair duality in construction companies means 
that there is less of a separation of ownership and control, and 
while there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that separating 
the roles results in a better organisational performance (Elsayed, 
2007) it is widely argued that duality hinders the board’s ability to 
perform its governance functions and leads to poorer monitoring 
of risks, particularly CEO performance (Rechner and Dalton, 
1991). 
The ratio of outside directors to inside directors is the other 
measure of a board’s independence. Given that the sample 
of construction companies performed below the ASX top 20 
benchmark, understanding the implication of this is important. 
In particular, Coles et al. (2008) found general consensus that 
a higher proportion of independent directors will result in more 
effective monitoring of the organisation or even improve the 
organisation’s performance. The area of risk management in 
particular is widely regarded to be very important for construction 
companies which operate in a high risk environment. It is also 
an area of defi cient performance in comparison to other high-
risk industries (Loosemore et al., 2005). In this context, the idea 
of introducing a risk management committee (in addition to an 
audit committee), comprised of only independent directors, 
would increase board effi ciency in risk oversight and control, 
help ensure the appropriateness and effectiveness of the risk 
management systems in place and instill confi dence in investors 
about the effectiveness of the company’s risk management 
strategies. 
CONCLUSION
This research shows that construction companies could improve 
levels of independence on board subcommittees. The importance 
of independence differs for each committee. For example, the 
nomination committee needs independence to ensure that the 
right person with the right skill set is being elected to the board, 
rather than someone who is selected by the CEO to do as they 
are told. It will also help to ensure more transparent nomination 
and election processes, more effective board and director 
evaluations, and effective board succession planning. The 
remuneration committee is charged with determining appropriate 
levels of payment for the executive directors and independence 
helps to prevent excessive director remuneration packages, 
ensures appropriate performance incentives for directors, and 
enables shareholders to have confi dence that their best interests 
are being maintained. Finally the audit committee is in place 
to ensure the protection of shareholders’ interests in fi nancial 
reporting. An independent audit committee safeguards the 
integrity of the company’s fi nancial reporting, ensuring accuracy 
of reporting and leading to greater investor confi dence. 
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